GPS spoofing map
Last updated
The map above shows where aircraft reported a loss of trusted satellite position during the last UTC day. Spoofing, which feeds a receiver a false position, is one of the things that does that; this page says how it shows up here and what the map cannot tell.
What the map shows today
From flights on 7 November 2026: 935 of 24,198 monitored areas worldwide showed high interference and 2,350 medium. This day's page has the region table and a citation.
A spoofer broadcasts counterfeit satellite signals. A receiver that locks on to them computes a position that is wrong, sometimes by hundreds of kilometres, and a modern aircraft receiver that notices the disagreement between its satellite fix and its inertial and radio navigation lowers the accuracy it reports, or drops the satellite fix altogether. Both leave the same mark in ADS-B as jamming does: a low Navigation Accuracy Category for Position (NACp). This map counts that mark. It therefore shows spoofing when spoofing degrades the reported accuracy, and it cannot separate spoofing from jamming on its own; the jamming versus spoofing page sets out why.
What spoofing looks like on this map
Three patterns recur. A red cluster that stays over the same airport or coast for weeks, not days, which has been the picture over the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea since 2023. A sharp edge, where hexagons go from green to red across a border or a coastline, as around Kaliningrad. And a band along a flight corridor, where every aircraft on the same route reports the same loss at the same altitude; the "By altitude" table on each region page shows whether the loss sits in the cruise layers or down near the ground. None of these patterns is proof: a jammer produces the first two as well. Where a regulator or a government has said what the cause is, the region page quotes it with the source.
What the map cannot tell
It cannot see a spoofed aircraft whose receiver believed the false position and kept reporting good accuracy; those aircraft look healthy in ADS-B, and only their track, which this map does not draw, would give them away. It cannot say which satellite system was attacked, since ADS-B reports accuracy, not constellation. It counts aircraft at altitude, so interference that reaches only the ground, or only ships, does not appear. And it needs three aircraft in a hexagon before drawing it, so a single spoofed flight over open sea is not shown. The methodology lists every limit.
Other public maps
| Map | Data | What it draws | Updated | Past days |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GPSInterference.com | Open ADS-B track history from adsb.lol, every receiver feeding it | Share of aircraft per hexagon reporting NACp of 7 or less: green under 3%, yellow 3–10%, red over 10%, purple over 50% | Once a day, about 04:40 UTC, for the previous UTC day | Every saved day, each with its own page and JSON; open data (ODbL) |
| gpsjam.org | ADS-B from airplanes.live and ADS-B Exchange, by its FAQ | Share of aircraft per hexagon reporting low accuracy: green under 2%, yellow 2–10%, red over 10% | Once a day, soon after midnight UTC | Daily maps back to February 2022 |
| Flightradar24 | ADS-B from Flightradar24's own receivers, by its support page | Areas where a significant number of flights report lowered NIC | Every 6 hours | Not stated |
| GPSwise | ADS-B relayed by the OpenSky Network, by its site | Anomalies in reported positions, flagged as jamming or spoofing | Live, as it describes it | Not stated |
Every saved day has its own page under days, with the region table and a citation, and the API returns the hexagons for any of them. The GPS jamming map page describes the same map from the jamming side.